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The European Monetary Union (EMU) is certainly in
a crisis. There can be no doubt that the recent rescue
plans and packages of the past months were necessary
to stabilize the euro area and the financial markets in
the short run (Bundesbank 2011). However, it remains
questionable whether this rescue path will lead to a
sustained framework of economic governance in the
EMU. There is a huge danger that the EMU will fol-
low the wrong path – i.e. that of a short-run rescue
philosophy (The Economist 2011). We argue that the
consequences of following the current short-run poli-
cy will lead to a future break-up of the EMU. Learn  -
ing the lessons from sovereign debt crises, in other
words, identifying the failures before this crisis
emerged, is essential to the process of building a new
and sustainable European economic governance
framework.
The current rescue philosophy of helping indebted
countries with guarantees on the one hand and
demanding strict austerity on the other hand is mere-
ly appropriate as a short-run stabilization of EMU.
However, this rescue strategy does not address the
structural problems and improper incentives of par-
ticipating countries in the medium and long run.
There is a substantial danger that policymakers will
follow the wrong stabilization policy because of polit-
ical path dependency. This short-run policy response
might create even more moral hazard and free-riding,
thereby putting the whole EMU at risk. A solution to
its structural problems requires an answer to the ques-
tion of why the EMU is in such a mess?
The monthly frequency of new stabilization packages
for Greece, or even the entire banking system, illus-
trates that the EMU is at a crossroad. The past and
present problem is the existing weak and non-credible
economic governance framework, and more specifi-
cally, the ineffectual enforcement of existing rules on
fiscal discipline. There have been hardly any officially
defined consequences in cases where countries violat-
ed fiscal rules since the foundation of the EMU in
1999. Strengthening economic governance with
respect to fiscal discipline and strict conditionality is
necessary to sustain European Monetary Union.
Even the recently proposed economic governance
reforms like the Euro-Plus Pact, the Reform of
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), European Semester,
European Strategy 2020, and the European Stability
Mechanism (EMS) are not far-reaching enough to
tackle all of present and future structural problems
(Herzog 2011).
A long-run stable and sustained economic gover-
nance framework needs two arms: firstly, a more
depoliticized enforcement mechanism for breaching
countries, and secondly, immediate and tough con-
sequences for countries that do not comply with the
defined (ex ante conditions of) fiscal rules. In the
past year the European economic governance
framework has changed dramatically. A new rescue
net called the ‘European Financial Stability Facility’
(EFSF) has been created for all EMU countries.
This has led to fewer incentives for each member
state to bear the consequences of its own fiscal pol-
icy decisions. Despite the fact that the EFSF
requires countries under the rescue umbrella to
implement austerity measures, this umbrella simul-
taneously enforces moral hazard. Furthermore,
what is to be done with countries that do not com-
ply with the rules or implement the required auster-
ity measures?
In a nutshell, we must establish a new balance
between the ‘rescue’ incentive structure, on the one
hand, and fresh demand for stricter fiscal discipline
and tougher ultimo ratio sanctions, on the other. Since
the first reform discussion on the Stability and
Growth Pact in 2005, there have been demands for
either an automatic enforcement or cession of sover-
eignty to an independent EMU body. This paper
argues that, in extraordinary cases of fiscal cheating
over a period of more than four years, an automatic
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ultimo ratio option is required for those countries:
either to lose sovereignty or be excluded. 
What is wrong with European economic governance?
The bad news is that all of the European economic
governance safeguards to date – the Maastricht
Criteria, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
(BEPGs), and the Stability and Growth Pact – have
had little to no effect over the past decade. Since the
foundation of EMU economic governance in the
1990s, there has definitely been room for improvement
in several areas: (i) the selection process of economi-
cally and fiscally sustainable member countries was
not binding and strict enough, (ii) the economic coor-
dination processes were rather weak and have proven
totally ineffective, (iii) the enforcement of the Stability
and Growth Pact has not worked in political practice,
and (iv) the lack of an exchange rate mechanism in
the euro area, which typically provides a disciplining
mechanism for countries, has generated a lack of fis-
cal discipline (free-riding), and has failed to inspire
any further efforts towards structural economic
reform. On the contrary, the existing framework and
the recent rescue nets have promoted free-riding and
moral hazard.
For the past decade overall EMU governance has
been weak and policymakers did not see any need to
improve it. In the end, euro area policymakers have
accepted nearly every potential member state that
attempted to achieve the five Maastricht or
Convergence Criteria (European Commission 2011).
Even at the time of the EMU foundation in 1999,
almost no country was in line with all of the thresh-
olds of the Maastricht Treaty. The same applied to
Greece in 2001. Moreover, the entrance criteria are no
guarantee for convergence within the EMU. In the
past decade, we have witnessed growing divergence in
terms of competitiveness, as well as growing inflation
and growth differentials. All this indicates the failure
of the existing economic governance setting and prob-
ably also points to a weak selection process.
The so-called ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’
were just an alibi for policymakers without any effec-
tive function and sanction. Despite the goal of coor-
dinating social and labor policy in Europe, no credible
incentive and/or enforcement mechanism was put in
place to achieve this goal. However, the idea of a com-
mon goods and capital market requires a certain
degree of coordination – some even argue in favor of
comprehensive harmonization. In hindsight the
movement towards coordination or harmonization in
terms of fiscal policy was fairly invisible. Most
reforms, on the other hand, strengthened national
sovereignty and national exceptions.
The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis illus-
trate this reality: financial markets are international,
but their regulation is effectively national. The fact
that some people say ‘banks are international in life,
but national in death’ (Goddhart 2009), is neither true
in a monetary union nor in an interconnected world.
The case of Ireland taught us that the costs of bank
bail-outs are not just born by Irish taxpayers, but by
all European taxpayers. This illustrates the need for
European coordination in terms of both economic
and financial regulation/supervision on a suprana-
tional level. Moreover, the cases of Greece, Portugal,
Italy and Spain illustrate the need for structural
reforms in social and labor policies. There is simply no
other way to regain competitiveness in a monetary
union. Hence, some coordination of these policy
fields is essential to EMU. Let us consider simple
example: politicians in all countries, and particularly
those with a weak competitiveness structure, have to
learn that 70 percent of national inflation is caused by
excessively high wages (ECB 2009 and 2011) and one
reason for the latter is wage indexation rules. Fur  -
thermore, it is hard to explain to people in highly
competitive countries why they must work until they
are 65 or 67 years old, while people in troubled coun-
tries have a legal retirement age of 60. All this does
not generate European solidarity or the requisite will-
ingness to pay in emergency cases. We definitely need
greater coordination in all economic policy areas.
The Stability and Growth Pact, which was imple-
mented to discipline fiscal policy within the EMU,
was a clear effort to move in this direction. However,
political unwillingness and improper institutional
design made the pact difficult to enforce. Since its
implementation in 1997 there have double-digit viola-
tions of the Stability and Growth Pact, none of which
gave rise to appropriate sanctions. Hellwig (2011)
rightly concluded that: “the lack of credibility of the
Stability and Growth Pact was identified as a problem
[long before]. Therefore it seemed likely that, at some
point over the medium run, we would come across a
problem like the one that Greece has posed over the
last year”. Since the adoption, and particularly during
the reform discussion of the SGP in 2005, economists
have proposed over a hundred alternative ways of
improving the existing Stability and Growth PactCESifo Forum 4/2011 25
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(Fisher et al. 2006). There was, however, no political
will to do so!
Now it is time to learn the lessons of the past and
change improper political ideology and strategy in
Europe. Apart from the Stability and Growth Pact’s
weak institutional design and its enforcement prob-
lems, there are further unseen issues: the Pact does
not focus enough on long-run debt sustainability and
the 60 percent of GDP debt limit. Both issues did not
trigger any sanctions. The fact that Ireland did not
even appear on the radar screen of the SGP illus-
trates the Pact’s weaknesses and potential for opti-
mization.
Finally, the lack of an exchange rate mechanism in
EMU has destroyed the international competitiveness
of important industries in some European countries.
Usually, the loss of competitiveness affects the
exchange rate, but in a monetary union with irrevoca-
bly fixed nominal exchange rates that disciplining
mechanism does not work. Eichengreen and
Hausmann (1999) showed that normal state lenders
distrust such governments and therefore refuse to lend
in the country’s currency. If Greece and Portugal had
possessed their own currency, they could have deval-
ued it now. However, both would not have been able
to borrow in their own currencies without the com-
mon euro in the first place. This illustrates another
reason for the lack of fiscal discipline. The common
currency and missing exchange rate mechanism
reduced the incentives for economic reforms, and
especially wage restraints, in the euro area. Moreover,
(financial) market participants have learned quickly –
particularly in the case of Ireland, Greece, Portugal
and recently Spain, Italy and France – how to gamble
with national EMU member states and in the end the
whole euro area.
Altogether the inexistent economic governance frame-
work and the rescue procedures during the sovereign
debt crises have led the EMU down the wrong path.
This constellation put all national governments and
the EMU at risk. To resolve the current crisis, we have
to look for new solutions and innovative institutional
rules. Otherwise the EMU’s very existence is at risk.
The majority of economists are convinced that the
EMU is economically necessary in a globalized world
and good for the welfare of all citizens. However, if
citizens want to have a steady and sustained monetary
union in the future, policymakers must proceed with
new rules to safeguard the economic success and
unprecedented price stability of the EMU.
What next? Master plan and policy recommendations
EU policymakers are still far from finding the right
way out of the sovereign debt crisis and towards a
long-run sustainable framework. The good news is
that there is an appropriate solution, and after imple-
menting new rules the European Monetary Union
will no longer be in danger!
Below I develop a kind of master plan to re-establish
stability within the EMU. In general there are two
options. Both options, however, do not work unless
the credibility of the existing framework can be re-
established and enhanced. Option A constitutes a fun-
damental change to the existing policy framework of
EMU. This option would insist that EMU member
states abandon a substantial part of their national
sovereignty over fiscal policy. This would require
immediate, fundamental legal changes on a European
and national level. The recent judgment by the Cons  -
titutional Court in Germany has more or less elimi-
nated this option for the near future (Bundesverfas  -
sungsgericht 2011). A European state is not possible
within the current German constitution and it would
require major changes in law. Let us labour under no
illusions: the path towards adopting this option is
long, difficult and calls for the broad support of all of
the citizens in all euro area member states. An
approach featuring a European state with a European
government responsible for a budget is currently not a
realistic solution. The political will for doing so is not
available, popular support is lacking and there is no
blueprint for proceeding along that path.
More realistic, however, is option B. This is based on
strengthening the fiscal incentives for sound fiscal pol-
icy within the current framework. Option B requires a
return to plus an enhancement of the fundamental
principles of a monetary union:
￿ Each member state has to bear the consequences of
its own fiscal policy decisions,
￿ Market interest rates are the disciplining mecha-
nism of unsound debt policy,
￿ Automatic enforcement mechanisms of the rule-
based framework (Stability and Growth Pact),
￿ Implementing new mechanisms to avoid growing
differentials in terms of growth, inflation, current
account etc., and
￿ Ultimo ratio punishment options for notoriously
unsound countries.
The key philosophy of option B is that countries bear
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combination with a rule-based and decentralized
framework. Consequently, it represents a return to a
strict no-bail-out clause (Article 125 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union). Moreover,
the European Central Bank (ECB) must go back to its
primary objective of price-stability and has to abide
by the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 105
and 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union).
Such a rule-based framework, together with pressure
from the financial markets, would be able to preemp-
tively discipline fiscal policy in the euro area. Hence,
the basic idea of the current rule-based approach is
not dead (Issing 2011; Weidmann 2011). What makes
it weak and almost dead, is the past and current
implementation of the rules, especially the weak
enforcement and political discretion involved in
EMU economic governance. The combination of
domestic fiscal responsibility with automatic control
mechanisms via rules and markets would be as effi-
cient as a European State from an institutional eco-
nomic view. Both enhance financial stability and the
stability of EMU.
Both options offer sustainable solutions from an eco-
nomic point of view. However, the first option is unre-
alistic and the second also calls for major changes
within the existing framework. A combination of
both options, however, i.e. sharing the risks of
unsound fiscal policy and retaining national sover-
eignty over fiscal policy, is also doomed to fail as we
can see from the short-run rescue strategy. Such a pol-
icy would undermine the incentives for sound fiscal
and economic policy even further, thus achieving the
opposite of stabilizing the EMU.
The timing of the next reform steps and policy
changes is critical to regaining stability within the
EMU. Hence, we have to discuss the essential policy
proposal to stabilize the EMU according to option B.
The new economic governance framework must be
strengthened and extended in several ways. The fol-
lowing new elements need to be implemented in the
near future:
Proposal 1: define ex ante conditionality for all partici-
pating EMU member countries.
The major underlying policy problem of the rescue
packages during the sovereign debt crisis and the
financial crises is moral hazard. To tackle this prob-
lem, we need consistent incentives to maintain sound
public finances and more conservative approach to
risk exposure – in short, lower debt levels. We there-
fore propose a turnaround of the EMU incentive
structure. If a country is selected as member of the
EMU, it must agree to abide by all criteria and rules
on accession and regularly thereafter. I would call this
‘ex ante conditionality’, which defines mandatory con-
ditions for all countries participating in the EMU.
These conditions are: sound public finances, (i.e. in
line with the deficit and debt threshold of SGP and a
balanced budget in the medium term), conservative
wage policy, and economic reforms to enhance eco-
nomic growth and finally competitiveness. Any viola-
tion of these criteria or rules should immediately trig-
ger sanctions because the mandatory conditions of
EMU are breached – like the conditionality of auster-
ity plans in the current rescue packages – to achieve a
sustainable EMU.
At present the conditionality (of austerity plans) is
unfortunately implemented too late. In fact, we do
not demand conditionality until after a crisis has
prevailed. Every country, however, has benefited
from the EMU since the beginning, without follow-
ing the necessary rules in terms of fiscal policy.
Therefore, the existing governance framework sets
the wrong incentives at the wrong time. We must
make the conditionality of EMU membership coun-
tries ex ante. This will be more efficient, less pro-
cyclical and avoid moral hazard. It clearly illustrates
to all members of the EMU that membership
requires sacrifice and fiscal discipline on a daily
basis. If a country fails to perform accordingly it is
fair to punish or sanction it right from the begin-
ning. However, the sanctions we need in such a new
framework should be stricter and, at best, enforced
automatically (see proposal 3 below).
A further advantage of ex ante conditionality is the
continued existence of cultural difference in attitudes
towards sound fiscal policy and price-stability within
the EMU. To further adjust and smooth European
attitudes and solidarity, the effective functioning of
those incentives and mechanisms is essential. This
enhances economic growth and competitiveness.
Today, for example, wage setting mechanisms are
quite different in Europe. This issue is part of the cur-
rent competitiveness problem.
Proposal 2: reform the Stability and Growth Pact:
(i) introduce immediate sanctions for violations of the
deficit and debt threshold and the goal of a balanced
budget in the medium term and (ii) improve enforce-CESifo Forum 4/2011 27
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ment either with an automatic or a vote and reputation
mechanism.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) needs to be
strengthened further in two directions. Firstly, an
excessive debt level should trigger sanctions as a
deficit violation of today. Similarly, a violation of
long-run sustainability, defined as a balanced bud-
get in the medium run, should also call for sanctions
too. Secondly, we have to improve enforcement of
the SGP which remains weak. There are two
options: either autonomic sanctions or reduced sov-
ereignty in the case of a breach. The last idea refers
to a vote and reputation function developed by
Casella (2001) and Herzog (2004b and 2004c). The
optional loss of sovereignty, but only in case of pol-
icy failures, would discipline euro area member
countries even more than today’s measures. Such an
intrinsic punishment of sovereignty losses out-
weighs the current extrinsic incentives of monetary
sanctions (Herzog 2004a). Moreover, this sanction
idea is not pro-cyclical on the budget and avoids
today’s moral hazard incentives. In sum, even the
recent reform proposal of the Stability and Growth
Pact, expressly consented by the European
Parliament on 28 September 2011, is not enough to
implement the urgently needed, long-run incentives
elaborated in my proposal.
Moreover, an automatic mechanism or a vote and
reputation mechanism goes much further than the
new ‘inverse majority’ voting rule (Herzog 2011). It is
the only fair mechanism in a supranational monetary
union under fiscal-monetary interaction and nation-
al fiscal policy. As long as a country is in line with the
European rules and principles, especially in fiscal pol-
icy, its sovereignty remains 100 percent national.
However, as soon as a country breaches the SGP, it
must give up some sovereignty to the supranational
level because ‘unsound’ national policy triggers – in
the worst case – negative externalities for other EMU
countries. The current sovereign debt crisis illustrates
these negative externalities in terms of financial mar-
ket instability, new mistrust in the banking sector,
further speculation over public debt in other coun-
tries and overall exchange rate speculations against
the euro currency. Hence countries have full sover-
eignty and voting power if they are in line with the
founding principles of the EMU, whereas unfulfilled
founding principles will lead to reduced sovereignty
rights and voting power for the concerned countries.
This sanction mechanism is economically efficient,
fair and necessary to ensure the long-term stability of
EMU. An automatic mechanism is fairly similar.
However, an automatic sanction procedure goes even
further than a vote and reputation mechanism
because there will never be any political discretion.
The concept of European fiscal government goes fur-
ther again than automatic sanctions. In this scenario
even the sound countries lose their national sover-
eignty at all times. This is an evident violation of the
subsidiarity principle in Europe. Furthermore, a vote
and reputation function is a better complement to the
idea of the guiding principles of ex ante conditionali-
ty in proposal 1.
The proposal of a voting and reputation function is a
kind of ex ante conditionality in case of policy fail-
ures. Consequently, it almost imitates – in the case of
a breach – an automatic sanction mechanism. The
breaching countries only have little or no voting
power and are therefore unable to block decisions on
a supranational level. The SGP will not work as long
as the policymakers, whose job it is to enforce them,
are not motivated by economic incentives or the
political power to do so. A transparent incentive to
align with the deficit and debt criteria will also
enhance the credibility of economic governance in
the future, because every country will know in
advance that any violation will trigger a significant
loss of sovereignty.
A recent proposal by Lauk and Wiesheu (2011) argues
in the same direction. They propose linking voting
power in the ECOFIN council with the official ratings
of a government. Only countries with a triple AAA
rating should have the right to vote. This implements
both a market control instrument and a sound incen-
tive structure. However, I would argue that this singu-
lar link is not a good idea because we further bow to
the rating agencies. The judgment of a rating agency
can be, and has not always been true and timely
enough. Think about the situation with Greece and
Italy. The downgrade of Greece and Italy came far
too late. Moreover, such ratings are sometimes biased
too. Therefore, the judgment of rating agencies is just
one step towards evaluating sound countries. Other
criteria must include: deficit and debt levels, strin-
gency of the national debt rule, the competitiveness
level of a country, its potential growth rate and its
national price stability. 
Furthermore, in the past decade even the European
Commission has failed in its official role as a guardian
of the treaty. The Commission failed during all
enforcement processes and the SGP reform in 2005.CESifo Forum 4/2011 28
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The Commission has not improved the enforcement
mechanism during the reform discussion and has not
protected the no-bail-out clause in the recent sover-
eign debt crisis. To tackle the weaknesses of the cur-
rent Stability and Growth Pact, it needs – without any
hesitation – a stricter enforcement process, less politi-
cal impact and discretion and, finally, more automat-
ic processes.
Proposal 3: either sovereignty loss or a principle of
exclusion is needed, in case of unsound fiscal policy.
This ultimo ratio threat makes sound fiscal policy pri-
ority 1 and finally helps to avoid moral hazard.
Due to the specific constellation of fiscal-monetary
interaction and the rescue umbrella incentives of the
EFSF and later on the EMS, we need some new final
incentives to promote sound fiscal policy. Firstly, we
recommend an absolutely strict no-bail-out clause
and only in special, rare cases do we allow the EMS to
take up a kind of lender-of-last-resort function. This,
however, is combined with even stricter austerity con-
ditions. Secondly, for a long-run sustainable monetary
union, we also propose to implement the exclusion
principle for unsound EMU member states as an ‘ulti-
mo ratio’ option. In other words, countries violating
fiscal rules for more than four years in a row either
lose fiscal sovereignty completely or have to leave the
EMU. After fulfilling the criteria of ex ante condi-
tionality and all required fiscal criteria, a country will
either regain national sovereignty, or, in case of its
exclusion, be given the option to rejoin the EMU
under specific constraints.
Proposal 4: democratizing European economic gover-
nance.
The new rules (regulations) and/or institutions of
European economic governance must serve the pur-
pose of democratizing fiscal policy. This means serv-
ing each national citizen best by maintaining a
national policy system and only integrating suprana-
tional coordination in special cases. However, if a
country fails to consolidate the public budget or to
enhance domestic competitiveness, the supranation-
al level should increasingly take responsibility for
this specific country. Under normal circumstances,
we recommend an environment where fiscal policy is
applied effectively on the national level to promote
national needs. This should enhance the welfare of
the domestic population and that of neighbor coun-
tries and businesses best. Of course, people matter to
every economy, which is why in case of sustained fis-
cal policy failures we should enable the fiscally
sound countries to decide how to dispose of their
taxpayers’ money, as they already do in the national
context. Hence, the new rules and principles must
serve European citizens, making our institutions
more democratic and better prepared to deal with
crises and risks. That means taking account of the
actual incentives that are created by our existing
rules at all times.
For the past decade, the European Commission and
other institutions have missed the point of fiscal dis-
cipline and the need for economic coordination. This
is due to three factors: bad institutional design, a
lack of any political will and the limited capabilities
of supranational institutions. Does this mean that
the European regulatory framework will always fail?
No! That is tantamount to saying that there should
be no referee in a football game, because he is inher-
ently less capable of playing the game than the play-
ers are. In fact, the referee is a key element in all
games – in football and in the EMU. Only with a ref-
eree can the best players show their real talents.
Thus, figuratively speaking, referees and good rules
prevent countries from playing roughly and unfairly
by supporting fair-play for the best or most compet-
itive countries.
Conclusions
The European Monetary Union will not fail and the
integration process will not be reversed if policymak-
ers implement stricter and more consistent rules, as
well as new incentives promoting more sustainable
solutions. Our proposed mechanisms will create a
well-founded EMU in the long run. Policymakers
have to learn that Europe, and particularly fiscal pol-
icy in a monetary union, is continuously hard work.
This has been shown by all historical monetary
unions over the past 200 years (Theurl 1992).
First and foremost, we have to get rid of the arbi-
trariness of fiscal rules and economic governance.
Democratizing European economic governance
means paying attention to all European taxpayers
during economic crises as well as under normal cir-
cumstances. Hence, the lesson is not necessarily to
become an ear of the political union or a ‘European
Government’, but to refine, extend and enhance exist-
ing rules and complement these supranational rules
and institutions with better enforcement procedures,
economic incentives and sanctions.CESifo Forum 4/2011 29
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We must design – similarly to our proposals – the
rules in a way that they serve the people best and pro-
mote growth as well as competitiveness. Demo  -
cratizing European economic governance does not
impose clumsy rules, barriers or restrictions which
reduce people’s welfare. Current policymakers have
the opportunity to learn the lessons and implement
the outlined recommendations. They have to put
together the right incentives to make the European
Monetary Union really irrevocable (Duisenberg
2004), otherwise a failure of the EMU is sadly only a
matter of time, as shown by the history of suprana-
tional monetary unions.
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